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Abstract. Since the Arab uprisings, religious engagement is central to EU relations with the 
Southern Mediterranean. Given that the EU is a liberal-secular power, this article investigates 
why and how the EU is practising religious engagement and whether it is a rupture with past 
EU modalities of engagement in the region. The main finding is that EU religious engagement 
constitutes both a physical and ontological security-seeking practice. This is illustrated in 
three steps. First, EU’s physical security is ensured by the promotion of state-sponsored forms 
of religion in Morocco and Jordan that aim at moderating Islam. Second, the framing of 
religion as an expertise issue in the EEAS and European diplomacies reinforces EU's self-
identity narrative as a secular power. This self-identity is, however, subject to politicization 
and framing contestation through the case of Freedom of Religion or Belief and the protection 
of Christian minorities in the Arab world. Overall, this article finds that EU religious 
engagement is conducive to selective engagement with some religious actors, which could 
potentially lead to more insecurities and polarization in the region. 
 
Keywords: EU foreign policy; secularism; religion; Islam; freedom of religion or belief; 
Christian minorities; security-stability 
 
Introduction 
Religious conflict has been one of the defining features of the Arab world since the 2011 
uprisings. The Syrian conflict has become a religious sectarian conflict rather than a freedom 
struggle. Persecutions against religious minorities by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
as well as terrorism perpetrated by foreign fighters, are certainly new phenomena of violence 
in the name of God that have marked European public opinions. European foreign affair 
ministries, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament (EP) 
have thus placed ‘religious engagement’ at the centre of EU relations with the Southern 
Mediterranean (Mandeville & Silvestri, 2015; Wolff, 2015; Hurd, 2015a). European diplomats 




actors and a European Parliament Intergroup publishes an annual report on the State of 
Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) in the world. 
Given the absence of EU competence on religion and its secular-liberal values, this 
religious engagement is rather surprising. Secularism, defined broadly as the separation of 
state and religious institutions and dignitaries, is indeed the main ‘frame of reference’ of EU 
foreign policy (Alidadi & Foblets, 2012: 390). In her vision for a post-conflict Syria, the High 
Representative Federica Mogherini wishes a country ‘united, not divided, secular, inclusive 
and with space for all minority groups’ (High Representative, 2016). Acknowledging that 
paradox, this article investigates why the EU is pursuing ‘religious engagement’, and to what 
extent it constitutes a rupture with past EU modalities of engagement in the Southern 
Mediterranean region. Analysing EU discourses on religion in relation with its Southern 
Neighbours, and building on the work of the critical scholar Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, this 
article researches the questions of why and how EU foreign policy decision makers frame 
religion as a foreign policy issue and what foreign policy practices of engagement it entails.’ 
This article contributes to literature that challenges the centrality of secularism in 
international relations (IR) (Birnbaum, 2016; Hurd 2015a; Mitchell, 2014; Berger, 1999). It 
confronts the literature on Normative Power Europe, EU foreign policy identity and values 
that take it for granted that EU secular values are universal and ‘a force for good’ (Poli, 2016; 
Risse, 2012, Lucarelli & Manners, 2006), with a few notable exceptions (Kinnvall, 2016; Mitzen, 
2006). After all, IR as a discipline emerged with the end of religious wars with the Treaty of 
Westphalia. Until the end of the Cold War, religion was excluded from the discipline’s 
thinking. Marxism considered it the ‘opiate of masses’, while methodological secularism 
prescribed ‘resistance to appeals to supernatural authority in practical inscriptions of social 
worlds’ (LeRon Schults, 2014: 185). Similarly, the literature on EU relations with the Southern 
Mediterranean has rarely explored the role of secularism and religion. The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was seen as an unreflexive attempt to export a ‘one-size-
fits all’ regional model (Bicchi, 2006) and to establish cooperative security practices (Adler, 
Bicchi et al., 2006). The security-stability nexus explains traditionally EU (lack of) engagement 
with Islamist actors thus avoiding further disaggregating its relationship with secularism and 
religion (Voltolini and Colombo, this special issue; Behr, 2013; Volpi, 2004); except for some 
notable contributions (Larsen, 2014; Haynes & Ben-Porat, 2013). If one assumes though that 
secularism is ‘one belief system among many that shape international politics’ (Hurd, 2004: 
237), two main implications emerge. First, it requires considering secularism as ‘a problem-
space’, namely ‘a historical arrangement of power’ (Agrama, 2012: 40). Second, it means 




against its hegemonic aspirations’ (Hurd, 2004: 237). Applied to the context of EU relations 
with the Southern Mediterranean, this article explores why and how the EU’s secular 
worldview impacts on the modalities of its engagement in the region.  
 
This article argues that although apparently ‘innovative’, EU religious engagement 
constitute physical and ontological security-seeking practices, which provide a stable regional 
environment as well as cognitive stability to the EU’s identity as a liberal-secular actor. This 
urge to find ‘security as being’ is translated in ‘an urge to establish routines in relations with 
other states or the ability to uphold a consistent biographical narrative’ (Mälksoo, 2016: 3). 
The main finding is that the EU’s framing of religion is a security performative practice shaped 
by the security-stability nexus outlined in this special issue. Starting with a discussion on how 
religion is framed within the EU multi-governance setting, the article proceeds to a case study 
on civilizational politics, namely inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogues. The analysis 
shows that this discursive practice has become de facto a ‘shared organising frame’ for EU and 
Southern Mediterranean elites aiming at moderating Islam. With this practice, the EU 
continues to produce hegemonic modes of engagement with state-sponsored and ‘official’ 
religions that provide stability for friendly regimes and physical security. The second and 
third case studies provide detailed accounts of this upholding of a biographical narrative that 
is subject to various understandings by EU foreign policy actors. By biographical narrative, 
we refer to states’ narrative of the self. Building on the definition provided by Giddens, this 
refers to how ‘states justify their action […] ‘talk’ about their actions in identity terms’ (Steele, 
2008: 10). In foreign affair ministries and the EEAS, the integration of religion into EU training 
and diplomatic practice is, in fact, driven by the concern to better ‘know’ the ‘other’ and thus 
to stabilize the EU’s liberal-secular identity. The case of Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) 
shows that the framing of religion as a ‘freedom’ issue is not neutral, in particular when 
rekindled through the persecution of (Christian) religious minorities in the Southern 
Mediterranean region. To conclude, this article argues that the EU’s framing of religion and 
its subsequent modalities of engagement can lead to more insecurities and polarization in the 
region, as it tends to reproduce hegemonic and Euro-centric modes of engagement. This 
article relies on around 25 confidential semi-structured interviews which are either quoted 
directly or provided background information for this research, conducted in Brussels and 
Washington and on discourse analysis. Interviews were conducted with policy-makers 
involved in ‘religious engagement’ at national level in Europe, in the EEAS and with 






Religion: a frame servicing EU security  
Although the nature of secularization (namely, the state-religion relationship) varies, 
secularism is a key feature of European politics (Norris & Inglehart, 2011; Berger et al., 2008). 
When asked which factors most help to create a ‘feeling of community’, fewer than one in ten 
respondents mention religion (Eurobarometer, 2015). Yet religion is a powerful frame in 
European and EU politics, instantiating that the EU’s secular identity is increasingly being 
contested and negotiated internally. The EU is, indeed, not ‘an a-religious sphere’ and offers 
structures of opportunities for transnational religious actors to influence EU decision-making 
(Foret & Mourão Permoser, 2016: 1105). Religion is mobilized by actors on ‘morality policies’ 
such as bioethics, LGTB rights and abortion, framing what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (Knill, 2013). 
It mobilizes networks, funding and volunteers (Schnabel, 2016). Article 17 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has institutionalized a dialogue between EU 
institutions and European churches and religious organizations. Formerly initiated by 
President Delors, in search for a ‘Soul for Europe’, this dialogue is structured around high-level 
annual meetings and involves also humanist and non-confessional organizations. 
Christianity, more specifically, has gained ‘greater legitimacy in European deliberations’ 
(Foret & Mourão Permoser, 2016) and has proven key to societal trust and cohesion (Schnabel 
& Groetsch, 2014). The enlargement to Eastern Europe and migration have brought religion 
back into EU policies (Kivisto, 2014; Byrnes & Katzenstein 2006). Eastern European churches 
use religion in the defence of national identity models confronted with a European secular 
and progressive model (Guerra, 2013). Thus, although the ‘religious and secular’ is 
acknowledged by elites as part of the EU’s cultural identity (Mogherini, 2016), the ‘resurgence’ 
of religion is a sign of more pluralism and a contestation of the exclusionary practices of 
secularism (Snyder, 2011: 201; Roy, 2008). 
Religious and ‘traditional’ values are also correlated to a rise of Euroscepticism and a 
reaction to a ‘désenchentement’ with European politics (Madeley, 2010), and with 
globalization. Ontological insecurity has increased, prompting actors and non-state actors to 
feel more existentially uncertain. Religious nationalism constitutes an ‘identity-signifier’ that 
is ‘more likely than other identity constructions to arise during crises of ontological insecurity’ 
(Kinnvall, 2004). Religious transnational actors have gained influence in international venues 
and states tend to bring more religious considerations into their foreign policy; thus, in 2013 
Putin visited Crimea along with the Moscow patriarch, and India’s secularism is being 
challenged by the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Religion is a constitutive element of 




2009: 279). Religion has become a source of expertise in conflict resolution and peace 
mediation. In the light of a crisis, and ‘cognitive uncertainty, religious leaders display expert 
knowledge of non-verbal symbolism, community sensitivities and histories’ (Gutkowski, 
2013: 126). Thus, the Sant’Egidio community, a worldwide network of Christians based in 70 
countries, is active in peace-mediation and ‘faith-based diplomacy’ and works in close 
cooperation with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Morozzo della Rocca, 2014).  
Uncertainty as well as cultural and historical contexts are two relevant factors in 
apprehending the way the EU is framing religion in the MENA region. First, the activation of 
religion as a frame by EU foreign policy makers is not neutral as it produces, or stabilizes, 
identities and (re)allocates power (Surel, 2000: 500). In times of uncertainty, such as the Arab 
uprisings, states and organizations like the EU, competing for their ontological security 
(Mintzen, 2006b) in search for ‘ a consistent and stable identity or sense of self’ (Giddens in 
Agius, 2016: 2). Religious engagement as a physical and an ontological security practice 
provides the EU with ‘a sense of continuity of self-identity’ (Agius, 2016: 3) as a global actor. 
This self-identity, although debated internally, has historically been constructed around 
secularism which shapes the way ‘practitioners think about religion and what is perceived to 
be religious’ (Birnbaum, 2016: 2). Religion is often seen ‘as the ultimate threat to the creation 
and preservation of “secular” spaces’ (Mitchell, 2014: 28). Secularism has acted as a survival 
strategy for European states, since ‘without a resolution to the religious question, the self-
destruction of the West was a very real possibility’ (Hashemi, 2014: 5). As an ontological-
seeking security practice, secularism considers religion as a cultural and identity marker that 
defines ‘us’ versus the ‘other’. European identity has been constructed in relation with 
‘significant others’ such as Islam (Mitzen, 2006: 271) as instantiated during the debate over 
Turkish accession. Turkish ‘candidacy destabilises the European secular social imaginary’ 
(Hurd, 2006: 402) and thus challenges its ontological security. Surprisingly though, even the 
most secular members of the European Parliament (EP) relied on religious argument to 
contest Turkish membership (Foret, 2015: 243-4). Although from different perspectives, both 
secular actors and Christian actors have found a common threat to their ontological security: 
Islam.  
Second, framing processes evolve through historical and cultural contexts.  
Within the MENA region, secularism is associated with hegemony, imperialism and 
colonialism.  Unlike Europe, where it emerged as an indigenous and bottom-up process, 
secularism was exported through ‘forced modernisation, secularisation and Westernisation 
by the state’ and ‘generated widespread social and psychological alienation and dislocation’ 




muzzle Islamist domestic opposition, leading to a surge in restrictions on religious freedom 
across the region (Bloom et al., 2014).1 Religion has been central to the resistance against 
authoritarianism and foreign powers. The founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hassan al-Banna, used Islam to try to liberate Egyptian society from British colonial control. 
This explains why secularism is regarded as ‘an ideology of repression’ (Hashemi, 2014: 7) at 
the centre of the EU’s normative agenda, another ‘mission civilisatrice’ that exports ‘alien 
values of either secular of liberal nature’ (Zielonka, 2013: 48) through informal domination 
that legitimises EU imperial policies in its neighbourhood’ (Zielonka, 2013: 36-37). Similarly, 
history is key as the EU relies on ‘already-familiar frames’ to find the ‘right kind of 
resonance between past, present and anticipated occurrences’ (Hyvönen, 2014: 95). In 
this sense, when specific ‘events’ or ‘crisis’ happen, frames are ‘not as much selected 
as semi-automatically adapted’ (Hyvönen, 2014: 95) in relation to historical and 
cultural contexts.  
The following case study illustrates the extent to which, since the Arab uprisings, the 
EU has used strategies of religious engagement with ‘official’ and state-sponsored ‘moderate’ 
forms of Islam2 – providing the EU with some physical security in its neighbourhood and 
countering radicalization at home. 
 
From engaging with civilizations to ‘moderating Islam’ 
Although initially a discursive action ideationally motivated to counter Huntington’s clash of 
civilizations, civilizational politics, also known as inter-religious and inter-faith dialogue, 
have provided a ‘shared organising frame’ (Gutkowski, 2016) to moderate Islam. This section 
shows that the EU has privileged engagement with official and state-led religious actors in 
Morocco and Jordan, thus servicing the security objective of moderating, or containing, Islam. 
This not only meets the physical security objective of supporting stable friendly regimes in 
the region but also engages with ‘like-minded’ religious officials that share EU security 
concerns. Civilizational dialogue has been instrumental for the EU to ‘outsource’ to its 
Southern Mediterranean neighbours the restructuring of Islam through socialization of inter-
religious dialogue (Bosco, 2016: 2). 3 
Following Iranian President Khatami’s initiative to organize a UN Year of Dialogue 
among Civilisation in 2001, inter-civilizational dialogue became a global priority for policy 
makers and intellectuals. The UN Alliance of Civilisations (UNAOC) was launched in 2005. 
Civilizations, as cultural and religious identity markers, became strategic frames for 




process of homogenization and uniformity of local cultures and traditions (Bettiza, 2014: 17). 
In the aftermath of 9/11, fostering inter-religious dialogue became a consensual priority for 
European diplomats, who framed it mostly as dialogue with Islam (Silvestri, 2005: 394). The 
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures was created 
in 2005 as part of the ‘Social Cultural and Human affairs Dialogue’ of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). Although the EMP’s idealized vision was based on the idea of 
‘civilisations as material cultures’ as defined by Fernand Braudel, it quickly evolved towards 
a religious understanding of civilization (Bettiza, 2014; Petito, 2011: 10). The EMP inter-
cultural dialogue ended by embracing the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ argument that it wanted 
initially to reject. By defining cultures such as Europe, the ‘Arab world’ and ‘Islam’, the EU 
reproduced Islam-West and North-South dichotomies, which helped to perpetuate an 
hegemonic view of cultures and politics by political and religious elites (Del Sarto, 2005: 326). 
It has also become a security strategy to contain and moderate Islam. Jordan and Morocco 
strategically mobilized inter-civilizational dialogue as ‘nation branding’ in their public 
diplomacy and gained leverage vis-à-vis the West in their actions to moderate Islam 
(Gutkowski, 2016: 209). Moderation here is defined as a ‘non-violent, non-radical, non-
rejectionist stance towards Western (usually US) foreign policies and a non-hostile stance 
towards Israel’ (Gutkowski, 2016: 215).  
Through the 2004 and 2007 Amman Messages, Jordan took the lead in communicating 
what Islam should be (Browers, 2011). The messages, endorsed and promoted by the 
Jordanian king, summarizes the ‘true nature of Islam’ and provides a message of unity in face 
of the current discord among Muslims (Browers, 2011: 944). Perceived as a strategy to 
moderate Islam and gain a counter-terrorist partner in the region, the EU supported the 
Amman Message with European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Instrument funding and the 
Instrument for Stability. Since 2013, the EU has funded the Royal Institute for Interfaith 
Studies that promotes the Amman message in Europe and the Middle East (Gutkowski, 2016: 
212). The ENP praises Jordan’s’ communicative action as a way to counter ‘extremist 
interpretations of Islam, incompatible with human rights and democracy,’ (European 
Commission, 2010: 17). In the ENP 2007–13, the Jordanian government is thus presented as ‘a 
valuable partner in the fight against terrorism’, ‘actively promot[ing] the Amman Message to 
counter interpretations of Islam, disrespectful of human rights, in both the country and the 
region’ (European Commission, 2010). Jordanian imams have gained an expert status on Islam 
among Western armies, as they ‘cooperated with the Afghan National Army and US 
personnel stationed in Afghanistan’ and ‘advised Swiss, Saudi, British and Kuwaiti military 




of the lack of EU leverage on democratization and human rights reforms in Jordan, the 
rhetorical frame of a moderate and peaceful religion serves, in practice, EU security objectives. 
Domestically, this rhetoric has helped the Hashemite monarchy to find a legitimacy as a 
guarantee of regional peace and stability. Since the Arab uprisings, the Amman Messages 
have been used to ‘undermine the claims of the opposition Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated 
Islamic Action Front’, one of the main domestic opponents to the monarchy (Gutkowski, 2016: 
212-3). The reasons for the success of this ‘shared organising frame’ were not only that it fitted 
the interest of Southern Mediterranean states, but also, in the case of Jordan, that it 
corresponded to the ‘‘Levantine myth of the mosaic’ of religious, ethnic and nationalist 
minorities living with the Arab, Sunni majority’ and that has helped to exercise authority 
domestically (Gutkowski, 2016: 216).  
Morocco is another strategic partner that promotes a national model of moderate Islam. 
Following the 2003 Casablanca bombings, religion became central to the monarchy’s political 
strategy. It engaged in a profound internal religious reform used to promote a model of 
‘moderate Islam’ based on Maleki rite and Sufism to its counter-terrorist partners in Europe 
and the US. Sufis, traditionally considered as mystical and heretic Muslims, have indeed 
gained the image of ‘Good Muslims’ (Muedini, 2012:4). Since 9/11, this branch of ‘liberal 
Islam’ has been used strategically by Sufi actors themselves ‘to assume a role within a struggle 
with both global and local implications’ (Salomon, 2016).  In the post-Arab uprisings, the Sufi-
Salafi divide was increasingly used to narrate the contemporary history of North Africa. 
Sufism has thus been used by Morocco to support a strategic framing of ‘moderate Islam’. 
Morocco’s ‘moderate Islam’ offers an alternative to radical Islam and Wahhabist influences 
from the Gulf countries and is diffused internationally through the new Mohammed VI 
Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidines, and Morchidates. Launched in 2005, the 
institute has concluded several agreements with Nigeria and Mali, as well as France and 
Belgium, to train their imams.4 Morocco has, through its image of being a ‘moderate Islam’ 
country, become one of the key EU security partners. Since May 2016, Morocco co-chairs with 
the Netherlands the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Morocco also took the lead in 
sponsoring FoRB and the rights of minorities with the January 2016 Marrakech Declaration. 
This Declaration, put together by 250 Muslim religious leaders, heads of state and scholars, 
provides a legal framework and a call to action on the Rights of Religious Minorities in 
predominantly Muslim Lands. 
Following the Arab uprisings, inter-civilizational dialogue has evolved towards 
engagement with ‘moderate’ and ‘stable’ state partners, such as Jordan and Morocco, that 




expression of ‘moderate Islam’ implies that Islam is not moderate and that it is a source of 
extremism and radicalization (Silvestri, 2010: 49). Religion is framed as a domestic and 
international security issue, and the EU’s desire for regional stability has enabled the 
securitization of Islam (Behr, 2013). In turn, this securitization of Islam reproduces ‘secular 
forms of subjectivity based on the privatization of religion and for disciplining and 
“producing” “good Muslims” compliant with the secular order’ (Mavelli, 2013: 179). It is 
deemed, however, to serve the purpose of providing physical security to the EU by containing 
violent religion and thus possible destabilization of friendly regimes that have become 
strategic partners in EU counter-terrorism policy. In the European Union Global Strategy 
(EUGS), ‘terrorism and violence plague North Africa and the Middle East’ (EEAS, 2016: 
7) and ‘inter-religious dialogue’ is presented as a tool in EU’s counter-radicalisation 
policy (EEAS, 2016: 21).  The deepening of relations with civil society actors, including 
‘religious communities’ is instrumental in securing and promoting EU values such as 
freedom of speech. One can wonder if EU’s pragmatic religious engagement is not 
also strategically used to avoid criticism about EU’s inefficient neo-liberal and 
democracy promotion policies in the region.5 The EU has narrated the Arab uprisings 
as pro-Western type of democracy, ‘local and contained’ (Hyvönen, 2014: 92) 
representing another ‘wave’ of democratization. This downplays the transnational 
linkages between the Indignados and Occupy Wall Street movements and the Arab 
uprisings. (Hyvönen, 2014: 92). Using the religious frame as an ontological security 
practice not only helps the EU to secure its identity as a secular power but also 
provides internal and external legitimacy of the ‘political order it represents’ 
(Hyvönen, 2014: 93).  
The following case study explores the extent to which religious engagement is an 
ontological-seeking practice. It evidences how routinized practice of expertise on religion, 
which developed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, is providing EU diplomats with ‘the 
illusion of knowing the other [and thus] enable[s] the self to act within its continuous 
narrative’ [of a secular power] (Chernobrov, 2016: 584).  
 
‘Expert religion’ in the EU: framing religion as a ‘knowledge issue’ 
The Arab uprisings have contributed to the framing of religion as a ‘knowledge issue’ and the 
development of European diplomatic training on religion. Although awareness regarding 
religion arose with 2006 Danish cartoons crisis, improving European diplomats’ ‘religious 




cartoons marked the start of ‘the fabric and imaginary of [EU’s] ontological security’ 
epitomized by the ‘Je suis Charlie’ phenomena that ‘enunciate[s] a clear distinction between 
a peaceful self-identity and a violent other’(Agius, 2016:12).  
The politicization and securitization of religion (or Islam) has fuelled cognitive 
uncertainty (Voltolini, 2015: 3). The Syrian crisis and the rise of religious violence following 
the Arab winter, were providential in strategically framing the need for more ‘religious 
literacy’. The 2016 EU Global Strategy thus states that ‘we live in times of existential crisis, 
within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our European project, 
which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, is being questioned’ 
(EEAS, 2016: 7). More engagement of EU institutions should improve ‘societal resilience’ 
through increased pluralism, which involves reaching out ‘more to cultural organisations, 
religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders’, in particular when it 
comes to ‘violations of the freedoms of speech and association’ (EEAS, 2016: 27). Religious 
sectarianism in the Arab world presents ‘damaging prospects for reconciliation. This carries 
risks for the future unity of the country and needs to be factored into the EU’s engagement’ 
(EEAS/COM, 2016: 11). Out of the 752 occurrences of the word ‘sectarian’ on the EEAS 
website,6 only nine appeared before 2010. Between 2000 and 2008 the term was used only in 
the Country Strategy Papers in Lebanon, Iraq and Indonesia. In 2010, the four occurrences of 
the word related to Iraq. Since 2011, the word ‘sectarian’ has occurred 743 times and has been 
almost always used in the context of the Arab world. EU funding has also been invested in 
Iraq and Syria to ‘promot[e] an alternative to the prevalent sectarian and violent discourse 
(€3.6m with further €10m envisaged in this area)’ (EEAS/COM, 2016). Although other frames 
have been enacted in the Syrian crisis, the sectarian frame, like the ‘humanitarian frame’, turns 
religious differences into the most salient features of the conflict, thus overlooking ‘the many 
aspects of human identity, history, political allegiance, sociality and experience – including 
alternative religiosities – that are relevant to the conflict’ (Hurd, 2015a:119).  
Religious sectarianism and violence has nonetheless provided a structure of 
opportunity for a small community of European diplomats to frame the issue as a need for 
more ‘expert religion’. As explained by one of its leading diplomats, Merete Bilde, the secular 
worldview of Western diplomats is a problem, as they ‘often discard religion as an 
epiphenomenon at best and an irritant at worst’ (Bilde, 2015: 157). European diplomats 
consider religion as ‘intrinsically problematic for policy’, ‘most diplomatic handbooks still 
largely hinge on realpolitik and interests, leaving little room for religion, identity, old culture’ 
(Bilde, 2015: 157). These diplomatic crises have led to ‘a growing realisation […] that 




Religion needs to be part of the EU’s ‘policy filter’ that requires ‘upgrading mindsets, skills 
sets and tools’ (ibid). Since 2013, training on religion has been introduced as an optional 
module in the EEAS training. Accordingly, ‘by increasing our religious literacy and sensitivity 
to non-secular worldviews, we hope to improve our ability to better navigate the politico-
religious landscape in countries and situations where a religious component matters. This also 
helps to raise awareness about how an overly secular worldview can lead to not only blind 
spots, but also occasional misconceptions and inconsistencies’ (Bilde, 2015: 158).  
The multiplication of violence in the Arab world and its ramification on European soil 
through terrorist attacks has contributed to instilling ontological insecurity. The latter indeed 
‘emerges when there is a disruption to routines, which invokes instability and a break with 
what is knowable, consistent and comprehensible to the self’ (Agius, 2016: 3). Foreign policy 
routines are then strategies to seek this ontological security, and through practice help to 
confirm specific identities (Agius, 2016: 3), like EU liberal-secular values. A close look at EU 
and European training on religion show that it serves the strategic purpose of promoting the 
implementation of the 2013 Guidelines on FoRB that I discuss in the following section. This 
remains a major focus of training,7 although sessions have also aimed at addressing the role 
of religion in development (Bilde, 2015: 160). Overall, by developing more knowledge on 
religion, European diplomats will become ‘smarter’ foreign-policy actors (Bilde, 2015: 160).  
The production of knowledge is not neutral, as it can become a ‘basis for action’ (Bicchi, 
2013: 3). It frames the identification of problems, the solutions and the tools by providing 
meaning on what is ‘right and wrong’ (Huber in Bicchi, 2013: 3). The framing of religion as an 
‘expert issue’ originated at domestic level and through transnational knowledge networks as 
an answer to rising religious violence in the Southern Mediterranean. The EEAS training has 
been modelled on a training organized by the Woolf Institute for the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO). This training promotes FoRB but also helps ‘British diplomats 
understand better the importance of religion in shaping foreign policy’ (Baker, 2013). The 
training was attended by 100 diplomats and other themes have included issues such as 
‘religious tension and freedom, the Church of England and international diplomacy, the right 
to be secular in the MENA, and the impact of conflict on relations between communities in 
the MENA’ (Baker, 2013). Religion and faith is presented as ‘a legitimate and important tool 
of foreign policy practice’ that is ‘increasingly essential in a modern world’ where religion, 
nonetheless, ‘is ever more important as a driver of political, social, cultural and even economic 
motivation’ (Baker, 2013). Like Bilde, Baker stresses that improving British diplomats’ 
understanding of religion(s) ‘needs to be an integral part of our diplomatic armoury’, as 




Religious expertise is also central to French diplomacy. In spite of its ‘laicité’, France has 
integrated religious expertise within its Foreign Affairs Ministry. Although France has had an 
Advisor on Religious Affairs since 1920, a ‘pôle religions’ was created in 2009 by Minister 
Bernard Kouchner within the Foresight unit of the Foreign Affairs Ministry with the aim of 
undertaking ‘preventive’ diplomacy and mediation. Concerned by the lack of knowledge of 
French diplomats on the role of religion in international relations, Kouchner recruited 
academics. Reporting directly reporting to the French Foreign Affairs Minister, the unit 
performs three functions: analytical, supporting the other geographical departments on 
religion-related questions or in the case of a crisis, and finally training future diplomats on 
religious issues. This new expertise was mobilized in the aftermath of the 7 January 2015 
terrorist attacks at Charlie Hebdo and in Paris.8 It became clear then that French embassies 
abroad had no contact at all with religious institutions and that more engagement was needed 
to ‘explain better French position on laicité’.9  Sufism and radicalization have attracted a lot of 
interest from the strategic unit, which also works with French external Intelligence services 
(Direction Générale de la Sureté Extérieure).10  
Getting to ‘know’ religion and the ‘other’ is thus part of an ontological security-seeking 
practice that strengthens the EU’s self-identity as a secular-liberal power. It is however, subject 
to contestation and negotiation by different EU foreign policy actors, as instantiated by the 
case of FoRB. 
 
Freedom of religion and the Christian minority issue 
The Syrian conflict has revived EU interest in FoRB and the protection of religious minorities 
in the Mediterranean. ISIS atrocities towards various ethnic and religious minorities has led 
to a strong mobilization of EU actors. Although many argue that existing human rights tools, 
such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, are enough to fight persecution against 
religious minorities, in 2013 the EU adopted guidelines on the promotion of FoRB, which are 
a basis for action for EEAS delegations. Without underestimating the unfolding tragedy of 
Middle Eastern Christians in the region, I show that the EU’s promotion of FoRB is an 
ontological security-seeking practice. As such it ultimately acts as a ‘technology modern 
governance’ that reproduces hegemonic modes of governance in the region (Mahmood, 2012: 
419) and is oblivious of the way European powers have used religious minorities to advance 
their interests in the region. 
EU interest in promoting FoRB in the Southern Mediterranean region needs to be 
historically contextualized. In 1535, the signature of the ‘Capitulations’ between François 1er 




They gained ‘a considerable degree of self-government in matters of criminal and civil 
jurisdiction as well as freedom of religion and worship’ (Mahmood, 2012: 421). Later on, post-
colonial regimes in the region relied on the legacy of the Ottoman millet system to consolidate 
their power. Privileging ‘the role of the spiritual head of the community’ instead of communal 
representation, the system allowed the Syrian Ba’th regime and the Jordanian monarchy to 
ally with Christian minorities (McCallum, 2012). Middle Eastern churches’ leaders privileged 
the stability of authoritarian governments over democratization as a strategy to protect their 
communities (Köse et al., 2016; McCallum, 2013). This explains why Christian minorities, in 
spite of sharing cultural values and practices with majority populations, still suffer from being 
‘agents of unwelcome Western influence’ (Perchoc, 2015). This strategy was not very 
successful, as Christian minorities have been on the decline for many years. Although 
Europeans ‘discovered’ their dramatic fate in the summer of 2014 with the atrocities 
committed by ISIS against Christian and other religious minorities like the Yezidis, the 
Christian presence in the region was shrinking well before the Arab uprisings. At the 
beginning of the 20th century Christians represented 14 per cent of the population, but now 
represent only 4 per cent of MENA residents and are a minority in every country in the region 
(Pew Research Centre, 2011). In 2003, with the US invasion of Iraq, 1.5 million Christians fled 
the country. In 2015 only 500,000 remained (Griswold, 2015). Socio-economic difficulties, 
religious persecution and discrimination, as well as a low birth rate and emigration, have 
contributed to their demographic decline.  
This historical context provides elements that help to understand the politicization of 
FoRB.11  Traditionally, the EU has promoted FoRB during enlargement negotiations with the 
Western Balkan countries and Turkey. EU conditionality has, for instance, strengthened the 
position of the Alevis minority in Turkey (Ulusoy, 2013). Following the Arab uprisings, the 
EU adopted the 2013 EU Guidelines on FoRB (Council of the EU, 2013). The guidelines state 
that ‘the EU will encourage states and other influential actors, whether religious or non-
religious to refrain from fostering inter-religious tensions’ (Council of the EU, 2013). The 
EEAS, as well as member states’ embassies and consulates, are implementing the guidelines. 
Delegations need to ‘identify and report on situations of concern’ (Council of the EU 2013) 
and to develop ‘more interaction and engagement with religious actors.’ 12  At the EEAS 
headquarters, an internal platform was put in place to implement the guidelines as well as to 
address religious issues and FoRB from crisis prevention and crisis management perspectives. 
Coordination between the relevant geographical desks and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and Arab League desks takes place regularly.13  On 9 May 2016, Ján Figel, ex-




external promotion of FoRB. Mandated by the President of the European Commission to act 
as Special Adviser to the Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, he 
reports annually to the Article 17 TFEU dialogue (European Commission, 2016). 
The EP is a central actor in promoting FoRB and religious minorities in EU’s Southern 
neighbourhood. Following a series of resolutions in 2014 and 2015, it unanimously declared 
in 2016 that ISIS was perpetrating a genocide through the systematic killing and persecution 
of religious minorities. One month later, the US House of Representatives adopted a similar 
text (US Congress, 2016). An Early Day Motion had also been tabled in January 2016 by 54 UK 
MPs (UK Parliament, 2016) and echoed similar statements from presidential candidate Hillary 
Clinton (Sherwood, 2016). The EP Intergroup on FoRB and Religious Tolerance is the main 
advocate for more FoRB in the EU’s external relations. FoRB is, however, a contested concept, 
since MEPs from the right (European People’s Party, European Conservatives and Reformists 
and Europe of Freedom and Democracy) ‘are much more sensitive about violations of the 
human rights of religious minorities in the rest of the world, often based on Christian 
solidarity with coreligionists’ (Foret, 2015: 99). Instead, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
in Europe, the Gauche Unitaire Europeenne and Green groups insist upon ‘individual 
freedoms’ and tend to pay more attention to discrimination within Europe. Similarly, 
Christian Democrat ministers tend to be favourable to FoRB action in the Council.14 
As with the concept of ‘expert religion’, global and domestic policy developments have 
influenced the framing of the FoRB as an EU policy issue. In 2000, the position of UN Special 
Rapporteur on FoRB was created, succeeding the Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance 
created in 1986. EU member states have also singled out FoRB as a special kind of human 
rights. The Dutch government has called for conditioning trade negotiations with third 
countries to respect for FoRB. Pilot projects were carried out by Dutch embassies in Armenia, 
China, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan and Sudan.15 The UK 
adopted a FoRB ‘toolkit’ as early as 2010 and created an Advisory Group on FoRB.16 FCO 
ministers took part in seminars advocating that FoRB is better for business worldwide.17 With 
the intensification of the crimes committed by ISIS against minorities, and in particular the 
enslavement and deaths of Yezidis, France co-sponsored with Jordan the International 
Conference on the Victims of Ethnic and Religious Violence in the Middle East in September 
2015 to find solutions to what Laurent Fabius, then French Foreign Affairs Minister, called ‘a 
systematic, barbaric process of ethnic and religious eradication’ (Fabius, 2015). Recalling 
France’s ‘strong historic ties with the Middle East, and especially Eastern Christians’, the 2016 
Paris Action plan combines the issue of refugees with the objective of ‘preserving the diversity 




The influence of European domestic politics shows that FoRB is a ‘socially constructed 
and quite contested concept’ (Richardson, 2015:1). The challenge of ‘multiculturalism’ has 
provided the FoRB with a ‘new vitality’ in Europe, allowing for ‘deep diversity’ by 
accommodating the pluralism of religious practices and minority rights (Alidadi & Foblets, 
2012: 389). Its rekindling with the issue of religious minorities is, however, enmeshed in a 
state-centred Westphalian system that ‘tolerates’ religion (Zucca, 2013: 3). Thus, instead of 
being guided by a universal meaning, it is driven by a ‘Euro-Atlantic’ understanding of 
religion, which ‘is very likely to divide rather than to unite’ (Zucca, 2013: 15). The US and 
Europe have supported authoritarian ‘secular’ regimes in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Libya before 
the Arab uprisings in the name of FoRB and because they would fight religious extremism. 
This does not always fit the reality of religious minorities in the region. Diplomatic 
engagement in the field of FoRB risks intensifying community divisions and reinforcing 
alienation (Roald & Longva, 2011). Religion is used to oversimplify the social and legal 
problems faced by minorities in their countries. It also tends to stress their status as victim, 
which ‘overshadows their status as social agents, active devisers and users of strategies of 
accommodation and self-empowerment’ (Roald & Longva, 2011: 3). Some minorities do not 
want to be regarded as such but instead as citizens. For instance, Copts reject their status of 
minority as ‘it disenfranchise[s] them from their nation’. It is a term rejected by their church 
leaders (Monier, 2014: 3). Instead, Egyptian Copts have claimed a right to ‘be considered an 
equal citizen deserving of inclusion and protection’ on the basis of citizenship rather than their 
identity as a religious minority (Monier, 2014: 9). Secularism thus structures ‘ideas and 
practices concerning religion’; ‘by making sure that the public was free from religion, 
secularism also defined what the public needs to be freed from and thereby defined the scope 
of religion itself’ (Birnbaum, 2016: 17). EU religious engagement runs the risk of being at odds 
with the aspirations of local minorities; it does, however, contribute to the narration of EU’s 
biographical continuity, which it equates at times with secularism in the liberal sense, and at 




Conclusion: engagement or containment of religion? 
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, religious engagement has become a new frame for EU 
foreign policy makers. The investigation of the three case studies shows that it constitutes 
both a physical and an ontological security-seeking practice. Civilizational politics, European 




Southern neighbourhood, all provide space for establishing new security alliances with ‘like-
minded’ regimes in the region and with co-religionists. It is also a way for EU foreign policy 
actors to narrate their identity as secular-liberal actors, an identity which is the object of a 
politicization inside the EU’s multi-level governance.  
Although presented as innovative, these initiatives reproduce EU hegemonic practices that 
prevailed before the Arab uprisings. First, EU religious engagement privileges state-
sponsored forms of religion that responds to EU’s security interests. Religion is associated to 
conflict and crisis management and is framed in order to promote EU secular values. Yet, even 
where the EU engages with transnational religious actors such as Christian minorities abroad, 
it remains Euro-centric and overlooks the reality of the ‘lived religions’ of people in the region 
(Hurd, 2015a). The EU reproduces state-centred and secular approaches to either governing, 
or rather containing, religion and to moulding official forms of religion and actors with whom 
it can engage. Depending on who is framing this religious engagement, it contributes to 
creating a ‘divide between officially favoured religion and the rest of world’s religion’; ‘all 
religions may be equal but some are always more equal than others’ (Hurd, 2015b: 8). This 
can, in turn, have an impact on the legitimacy of EU action in the region, as the framing of 
politics towards the Southern Mediterranean overlooks the desire of Arab citizens to engage 
in the public sphere and politics and reproduce an orientalist vision of the politics of the region 
(Marzouki, 2013) where security and stability prevail.  
This article has contributed to the burgeoning critical literature addressing the way the 
secular world order belief is affecting IR. Thus, when the EU adds religion to its discourse, 
this is not neutral and it is important to look into how European foreign-policy actors’ 
perceptions of religion is shaped by various historical experiences such as the war of religion 
in Europe or colonialism. As rightly put by Birnbaum, simply adding religion ‘to our 
analytical vocabulary will not make this vocabulary richer. Instead, it risks stabilising the 
normative historical construction of the concept – or particular manifestations thereof – and 
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